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NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED

20 July 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

1. Attached are two items you expressed an interest in while traveling with my boys on the West Coast.

2. Tab A is a guidance paper for the people at the A/P Facility on the classification of their materials. As a postscript to this, I would like to add a few points on the general OSA Security Staff philosophy regarding classification, declassification, downgrading and desanitization.

a. We stress with our vendors the desirability of keeping classified project papers to a minimum. Hence, the volume of project paper is surprisingly small from what you would expect from operations that have been swinging along for ten years.

b. We insist that our vendors keep all paper within the project areas within the companies and since this is the case, the handling of Secret items becomes virtually indistinguishable from the handling of Top Secret items.

c. When we are in the process of classifying, we probably tend to err in the direction of over-classifying since the overall policy of the U. S. Government as expressed in NRO pronouncements is to consider the whole business very much a Top Secret affair.

d. We do review the appropriateness of our classification decisions periodically, but I would be the first to admit that probably more of this kind of reviewing would be a good thing.

3. Tab B is the somewhat famous seventeen point philosophy paper indicating the directions in which the

NRO review(s) completed.

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Page 2

United States seems to be going vis-a-vis reconnaissance  
and probable admissions re same.

[REDACTED]  
Chief, Security Staff  
OSA

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Attachments  
Tabs A & B

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OSA/SS [REDACTED]

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ADVANCED PROJECTS PROCEDURES (SOP)

Number: C-102-1  
Effective Date: 11 May 1965  
Page: 1 of 4

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DOCUMENT SECURITY CHECKLIST

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1.0 REFERENCE:

A/P SOP No. C-102, effective 11 May 1965, subject: A/P DOCUMENT CONTROL.

2.0 PURPOSE:

To provide a ready reference of topics, subjects or conditions with appropriate security classifications by which the classification of a document may be determined and applied.

3.0 SCOPE:

3.1 All documents which are received at the A/P facility from other facilities will be reviewed by the Document Control Officer (DCO), for conformance to this list and classification will be upgraded, if necessary, after coordination with originator, in accordance with Paragraph 4.4.3 of the referenced document.

3.2 All documents which originate within the A/P facility will be reviewed by the originator with reference to this checklist, and classification applied appropriately, in accordance with Paragraph 4.4.1 of the referenced document.

3.3 All documents leaving the A/P facility will be reviewed with reference to this checklist by the Document Control Officer (DCO) in accordance with Paragraph 4.4.2 of the referenced document.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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NSC Action

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Space Policy and Intelligence Requirements

- a. Discussed the report of the ad hoc committee on political and informational aspects of satellite reconnaissance policy, prepared in response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 156.
- b. Approved recommendations 1 through 17 of the report (see attachment).
- c. Approved recommendation 18, revised as follows:

"The US should not, in presenting more detailed proposals for a separate group of measures to 'reduce the risks of war,' include advance notification of space launchings. If attempts are made by others to include space launchings with missile firings, the US should point out that (a) the trajectory of space vehicles can be distinguished from missile firings, so that space launchings would not be confused with missile firings, and (b) measures relating to disarmament of outer space, which we are proposing include appropriate controls over space launchings."
- d. Referred recommendation 19 to the ad hoc committee for revision in light of the discussion.
- e. Noted the President's request that he receive promptly from the ad hoc committee specific recommendations as to the instructions to be given to Ambassador Dean covering his negotiations during the forthcoming disarmament talks in Geneva.

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ATTACHMENT

RECOMMENDED POLICY

1. The United States should maintain the legal position that the principles of international law and the UN Charter apply to activities in outer space and, specifically, that outer space is free, as are the high seas.
2. The US should therefore continue to avoid any position implying that reconnaissance activities in outer space are not legitimate. Similarly, we should avoid any position declaring or implying that such activities are not "peaceful uses."
3. The US should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance" satellites, and where appropriate use instead such broader and more neutral terms as "observation" or "photographic" satellites.
4. Further studies should be made on an urgent basis to determine whether there are releasable data, such as mapping information, or procedures such as occasionally calling TIROS and NIMBUS vehicles "photographic" satellites, which would help create wider public acceptance of space observation and photography.
5. NASA should study urgently the possibilities of accelerating bilateral international cooperation to develop non-military space activities involving space observation, perhaps including photography.
6. It is recognized that the US cannot entirely avoid or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, so that where feasible the US should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy of space reconnaissance.
7. When confronted by specific Soviet pressure to outlaw reconnaissance activities in space, the US should continue to take a public stand for the legitimacy of the principle of reconnaissance from outer space, the precise form and extent of which would depend upon the circumstances of the confrontation.
8. The US should not at this time attempt to conduct a truly clandestine program (by which we mean a program with covert and unregistered launchings, and public denial that the US is engaged in reconnaissance). However, the US should pursue the research and development for a stand-by capability for clandestine operations in case circumstances ever make such operations necessary.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

9. The present practice of not identifying individual military space launchings by mission or purpose is sound. We believe, however, that there should also be a more open (but not more detailed) public reference to the general over-all military program. An appropriate nickname for public identification should be given to the over-all military program, with its objectives intentionally stated in broad and general terms. All military launchings would be described in terms of the general objectives of the over-all military program. No specific mission would be ascribed to any particular launch.

10. The US should not, at this time, publicly disclose the status, extent, effectiveness or operational characteristics of its reconnaissance program.

11. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding concerning reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure consistency with the policy guide-lines suggested in these recommendations.

12. No public attention should be directed toward [redacted] any publicized demonstration of developmental work and any actual test of such a capability should require White House approval, with full account given to the adverse effects for our reconnaissance satellite program. [redacted]

13. The US should discreetly disclose to certain allies and neutrals selected information with regard to the US space reconnaissance program, making each disclosure orally and at a time and in a manner that will preserve the essential security of our program while impressing upon them its importance for the security of the Free World. Disclosures should be made in a manner that will preclude acquisition by the Communist Bloc of usable evidence of an official US acknowledgement that we are conducting a satellite reconnaissance program. Proposals for such disclosures should include clearance by the National Reconnaissance Office.

14. The US should in private disclosures emphasize the fact of our determination and ability to pursue such programs because of their great importance to our common security, despite any efforts to dissuade us.

TOP SECRET

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15. The US should note in connection with private disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically defined disarmament agreements, the US cannot agree to (a) declarations of the precise purpose of all satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) general requirements for advance notification of all satellite launchings and the tracks of satellites, (d) pre-launch inspection of the satellites, or (e) a specific definition of peaceful uses of space which does not embrace unlimited observation.
16. The possible roles of space reconnaissance in disarmament inspection arrangements or in creating military stability should be further studied.
17. The US should stand by the disarmament proposal for a provision in Stage One of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament banning weapons of mass destruction from being carried in satellites, and providing for advance notification and inspection of all missile and space launchings to insure that ban. The US should continue to exclude any ban on reconnaissance satellites.

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